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Abstract
Economists have long argued that central banks ran by technocrats have greater indepen-
dence from the government. But in many countries, politically experienced central bankers are
at the helm, including even highly independent central banks. To explain the level of central
bank independence awarded, we develop a formal model where nominating politicians screen
central bankers for their political ambitions. We show how screening and reelection efforts
by the nominating politician changes the level of autonomy associated with different types of
candidates. We predict that technocrats are associated with higher levels of independence than
nominees with political experience, but as the appointing politician faces tougher reelection,
candidates with political experience are associated with higher independence as well. We test
our theory using new data from 29 post-communist countries between 1990-2012. We find
evidence that the reelection strategy of the nominating politician is an important predictor of
the level of central bank independence. 1
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Introduction
Economists have long argued that central bank independence (CBI) protects citizens from oppor-
tunistic governments. They believe that appointing a politically independent, technocratic central
banker can shield the economy from expectations driven inflation. Puzzling, however, is that while
the level of CBI is increasing globally (Garriga 2016), we continue to see even highly independent
central banks helmed by central bank governors (CBGs) with political experience. What explains
the co-occurrence of rising CBI and politically experienced central bankers? What role do the elec-
toral strategies of the appointing politician play in how much policy independence is delegated?
According to the standard delegation story, the government gives up monetary policy auton-
omy to independent experts with inflation aversion (Barro and Gordon 1983; Rogoff 1985; Bodea
and Higashijima 2017) so as to credibly commit to low inflation.2 Research suggests that delega-
tion works best in democracies (Broz 2002; Bearce and Hallerberg 2011; Bodea and Higashijima
2017). But even in non-democracies, handing over monetary authority to bureaucratic experts, or
technocrats, can help save the economy from economic cycles, especially if power is shared with
elites through dominant parties (Shih 2008; Bodea, Garriga, and Higashijima 2017). With its fo-
cus on credibility, previous explanations ignore the possibility that central bankers themselves may
have ambitions for elected office and consequently, those individuals appointing central bankers
have incentives to screen central bank candidates for their electoral ambitions as well as for their
policy preferences. For example, we observe a number of cases where the heads of even highly
independent central banks have political careers. In the Czech Republic, the first governor of the
newly independent central bank, Josef Tos˘ovský, also served as the country’s prime minister in
1998, subsequently going back to head the central bank until 2000. Later, CBG Jir˘í Rusnok acted
as the country’s prime minister from 2013 to 2014 (Petrˇícˇek 2016). Furthermore, at times, central
bank appointments to candidates with political backgrounds coincide with increases, not drops, in
2But see Ainsley (2017), which suggests that delegation to inflation-adverse bankers is suboptimal.
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policy autonomy. For example, in Ukraine in 2010, CBG Volodymyr Stelkmakh was pressured
to resign to make way for Serhiy Arbuzov and formal central bank independence rose rather than
declined, despite Arbuzov’s political background. Arbuzov had unsuccessfully ran for the Donetsk
Regional Council prior to his appointment. After being CBG, Arbuzov went on to have a promi-
nent political career, serving as vice–prime minister and then prime minister (Dpa International
2010; BBC Monitoring: International Reports 2011).
We consider how the reelection efforts of the politician with appointment powers to the central
bank affects the level of policy independence the central bank has. First, we show how the level
of policy independence a politician awards depends on how easy or hard it is for the appointing
political to identify a candidate’s electoral threat level. When the appointer is relatively uncertain
about the political ambitions of the CBG, the nominating politician commits resources to deter
any politically minded CBG candidates from disguising their political ambitions. Consequentially,
candidates whose biography shows no inclination towards holding political office are more likely
to be awarded greater levels of independence than those with past political experience. Second,
as the appointing politician becomes more electorally insecure, it becomes less efficient for her to
commit resources to deterring politically interested CBG candidates, as additional effort spent on
screening candidates will not increase her chance of winning the election relative to other reelection
tactics. Thus, under these conditions, the nominating politician expends relatively less effort on
screening CBG candidates for their political aspirations and consequently awards similar levels of
policy independence to candidates irrespective of whether they held political office before or not.
Our mechanism is analogous to traditional labor market screening models. Consider a situation
where an employer does not know a job seeker’s true ability and would like to screen out candidates
of low ability. The pool of candidates that the prospective employer faces, however, can vary. If the
unemployment rate is relatively high, resulting in a wealth of candidates from which to choose, it is
efficient for the employer to spend resources on sorting out candidates of low quality. Alternatively,
if all job candidates are expected to be of low quality, or the labor market is competitive, it is less
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efficient for the employer to invest in screening candidates. One consequence is that even low-
ability candidates may get higher wages. In parallel, when all CBG candidates are politically
ambitious or if the appointing politician is electorally vulnerable, screening no longer “pays,” and
even politically ambitious CBG candidates are awarded relatively higher levels of policy autonomy
as well.
Our main empirical expectation is that under conditions of electoral competition, CBGs with
political experience are awarded higher levels of policy autonomy than the same candidates would
be if the nominating politician were more electorally secure. We test our argument using original
data from 29 post-communist countries between 1990 and 2012. As noted by Bodea (2013), the
post-communist countries not only represent an empirical domain where economic and political
changes occurred simultaneously, they also are a setting where political identities and ambitions
are particularly opaque. Because of the dominance of the communist party prior to 1989, the “true"
ideologies and intentions of individuals can be particularly difficult to parse, making screening es-
pecially challenging. As the main dependent variable, we measure monetary policy autonomy in
a number of ways, including rules allowing independent policy-making and formal restrictions on
lending to the government (Garriga 2016). We find that when CBGs with political experience are
appointed, their central banks can lend to governments more easily and are less policy-independent.
However, as elections facing the appointer become more competitive, any gap in policy indepen-
dence and lending limitations narrows for those governors that have political experience compared
to those without. This finding is consistent with our argument that nominating officials can appoint
technocrats to deter politically minded CBGs, but their willingness to do so decreases as their own
electoral insecurity rises.
Our findings offer an explanation for the puzzle of why we observe both central banks that are
highly independent yet are also staffed with politically experienced CBGs. We show that any policy
independence penalty that politically experienced CBGs receive on account of their political back-
ground attenuates as the nominating politician becomes more electorally vulnerable. Our theory
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highlights a new mechanism in the politics of CBI, demonstrating how technocratic appointments
may be compromised because of the electoral strategies of incumbents. Our theory aligns with a
growing literature showing the opportunistic use of bureaucratic institutions by political elites and
the prevalence of inter-elite politics, especially in countries transitioning to democracy (Alesina
and Tabellini 2007; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Svolik 2009). We also expand the existing work
on technocrats in office (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Wratil
and Pastorella 2018; Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2019) and we build on this literature by proposing
a dynamic of political competition between a principal and an agent. Finally, we also contribute
to growing evidence suggesting that politicians elected in competitive races have to work harder to
win support (Ward and John 1999; Malik 2019).
The Political Origins of CBI
Previous explanations for CBI usually center on domestic factors, such as policy preferences and
partisanship; the role of democracy and democratic institutions; the overcoming of political busi-
ness cycles (see, e.g., Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983; Chang 2003; Bearce
and Hallerberg 2011; Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997); or the role of international organizations,
private capital markets, and pressures for reforms by internationally linked epistemic communities
(Gray 2009; Johnson 2016; Maxfield 1998; Santiso 2013; Giesenow and Haan 2019). Even in
non-democracies, Shih (2008), shows how Chinese party cadres are willing to hand over monetary
policy to an elite faction that does not want to expand the monetary base and trigger short-term
growth, but they do so only when the economy performs poorly.3
Even if governments prefer to control the money supply, there are economic and political bene-
fits of monetary delegation. Besides reducing expectations-driven inflation, delegation of monetary
policy to an autonomous central bank can help stabilize coalitions with diverse policy preferences
(Crowe 2008); restrain deficit spending (Bodea and Higashijima 2017); and reduce information
3For a review, see Goodman (1991) and Fernández-Albertos (2015).
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asymmetries among legislators, coalition partners, and government officials, which can in turn
quel domestic conflicts between factions or rivals (Bernhard 1998; Treisman 2000).
In addition to these institutional accounts, scholars also highlight the personal attributes and
individual backgrounds of central bankers. In Kaplan (2017), left-leaning parties use the edu-
cational background of central bankers to infer their policy preferences; left governments only
appoint mainstream economists when the economy is doing poorly. In Johnson (2016), appointers
use information about careers in international organizations (IOs) to determine preferences. Actors
with IO experience are expected to hold loyalties to global epistemic communities, skewing their
preferences towards their international peer group. Similarly, in Adolph (2013), central bankers’
future career aspirations can affect their present policy preferences, with those interested in a future
career in finance demonstrating more inflation aversion.
While the aforementioned literature finds that candidates are likely screened for their policy
preferences or expertise, research overlooks whether or when candidates are screened for political
ambitions and no previous research examines how incentives to deter politically minded CBGs
may affect the level of policy independence awarded. But CBGs often have multiple career tracks,
including holding both elected and appointed office.4,5
According to the biographies of CBGs in post-communist countries, which is the sample of
countries we focus on, between 1990 and 2012, 40% of central bankers acted as politicians before
taking the helm of the country’s central bank. In our sample, CBGs have held important political
posts including president, prime minister, and minister of finance, among others. Figure 1 shows
both the increase in CBI and also variation in the proportion of technocrats (operationalized as
having had vocational experience exclusively outside of government) versus politicians (opera-
tionalized as vocational experience inside of government, excluding in the central bank) appointed
4For recent exceptions, see Johnson 2016; Shih 2008; Kaplan 2017
5Even in the U.S., the suggested appointment of Herman Cain to the Federal Reserve is noteworthy as Cain
competed in the 2012 presidential election. “Trump Considering Herman Cain for Federal Reserve Board, Sources
Say,” Bloomberg, January 31 2019. Similarly, Finnish Central Bank Governor Olli Rehn was also previously Minister
of Economic Affairs.
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as CBGs in post-communist countries since transition. While the share of central bankers with
political experience has stayed relatively constant over time, CBI has risen, and at a faster pace for
those CBGs with political experience. These two trends — the relatively constant share of tech-
nocrats and the increase in the level of CBI awarded to CBGs with political experience — suggests
dynamics beyond the standard delegation story. We offer a theoretical model that suggests that the
electoral vulnerability facing the appointing politician is one previously unexplored explanation of
these trends.
Figure 1: CBI and Political Appointments: Authors’ calculations from sample data of 27 postcom-
munist countries 1990-2012
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Theory
This section presents a formal model illustrating our argument. We present a simple, two-actor
screening model where a principal — in this case, a politician with appointment powers to the cen-
tral bank — has imperfect information about a possible CBG’s political ambition.6 We present our
6This is different than in Alesina and Tabellini 2007, who consider a similar appointment situation from a norma-
tive perspective.
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argument in three steps. First, we consider a situation where the nominating politician, whom we
call the “leader,” needs to appoint a CBG. At the same time, she wants to ensure her own reelection
and also wants to give up as little policy independence to the nominee as possible. Assuming the
leader is assessing a single candidate for the job, she needs to decide both the optimal level of
policy autonomy to award to the candidate as well as sufficiently invest in her reelection strategy
against a potential political rival. To simplify the model, we assume that the leader only considers
a single candidate and any selection criteria besides the political ambitions of the candidate oc-
curred previously.7 We also assume that the candidate’s political ambitions are less well known
to the leader than they are to the candidate. While the leader can observe information about the
candidate’s past career to infer political ambition, the leader remains only imperfectly informed.
The key question that the leader then asks is how to both ensure her reelection and also limit the
amount of policy autonomy given to the candidate.
Secondly, we show how the leader (she) can prevent the candidate (he) from misreporting his
true type by making discriminating offers. More specifically, the leader presents the candidate with
a menu of appointment offers with a different set of policy autonomy, d and reelection efforts, e,
committed to different realizations of the candidate’s type. In equilibrium, the leader makes dis-
criminating offers in order to induce the candidate to reveal his true type. Intuitively, the leader
lays out different combinations of re-election efforts and policy autonomy which target the dif-
ferent types of candidates. By promising greater policy independence to those more interested in
policy, the leader can deter those types that are politically ambitious from misreporting. In equi-
librium, each type accepts a different offer from the leader, and, holding all else constant, policy
independence is lower for those with political ambitions.
Thirdly, while the candidate’s true political ambitions are unknown, his previous career path
7We do not have lists of the possible pool of candidates nor measures of their policy preferences, so we assume
that any candidate meets the leader’s other criteria at some early stage. We also assume that the leader may consider
inter-party as well as intra-party electoral competition and so we do not account for partisanship although this may be
an interesting extension.
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is observable. Therefore, we compare the leader’s offer to the candidate when she observes prior
political experience and when she does not. Since politically experienced candidates are also more
likely to be interested in electoral politics, the leader wants to grant less autonomy. Conversely,
however, the leader has less incentive to invest resources on separating types as the candidate be-
comes either more electorally motivated or as the election becomes more competitive. This is
because any information gained is marginally less efficient. For example, where it becomes more
certain that the candidate is politically motivated, it pays marginally less to acquire such informa-
tion. Similarly, as the election becomes more fierce, spending resources on information gathering
at the expense of other tools to secure the election is more costly. As either the electoral arena
becomes more competitive or the exogenous pool of possible candidates becomes, on average,
more electorally threatening, the level of autonomy awarded to candidates with political experi-
ence increases, holding all else constant, as the appointer commits less resources to blocking their
entry.
More generally, given a situation where a principal selects an agent but does not know an
agent’s true ability or motives, the principal would like to identify candidates by providing incen-
tives to report the truth. The pool of candidates that the prospective principal faces, however, can
vary. If the pool of candidates the principal has to select from is relatively uncertain, it pays for
the principal to spend resources, offering discriminating offers so as to tell the different types of
candidates apart. Alternatively, if all candidates are expected to be of one type, or if competition
is fierce, it is less efficient for the principal to do so as any additional information she may receive
is marginally more expensive. Applied to our setup, when the nominating politician is electorally
vulnerable or as the candidate pool becomes more electorally threatening, screening candidates be-
comes relatively less efficient and consequently, CBGs with political experience are given higher
levels of autonomy then they would get if the nominating politician was more electorally secure.
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The Model
Formally, consider a situation where a nominating politician or leader, (L) must appoint a candidate
to the central bank, (K).8 In the United States, the nominating official is the president; however,
in other countries, other political actors make central bank appointments as well. Importantly,
in our model, the candidate the leader considers is both the leader’s agent and also a possible
electoral rival. We assume that different candidates have different relative preferences for holding
political office, f , and policy autonomy, p. To keep our model general, we model these preferences
as dependent on three things: Candidate K’s preference for holding political office, θ > 0; the
Leader L’s reelection efforts, e ∈ [0, 1]; and the amount of policy independence the leader grants
the candidate d ∈ [0, 1]. We call a candidate with relatively little interest in holding political office
a Technocrat and a candidate with a stronger interest in political life a Contender. We make a
number of assumptions in order to keep the model simple, which we outline below.
Assumptions about the actors: First, we assume that the leader considers only a single can-
didate and wants to determine whether the candidate is politically ambitious or not. For simplicity,
we assume that other dimensions, such as his policy preferences, are acceptable to the leader.
We also assume that candidate K is only of two types: policy-seeking (θ
¯
) (i.e. a technocrat) or
office-seeking (θ¯) (i.e. a contender) and that K’s political ambition, or type, is private information
known only to himself. We also assume that contenders always desire elected office more than
technocrats, so that f(e, θ¯) > f(e, θ
¯
) for all e(θ) > 0.9 We also assume that the leader’s own
expected valuation of retaining office, o(e), is increasing in her reelection efforts.10
Assumptions about the relationship between variables: Second, we assume that there is a
positive relationship between policy independence, effort, and the candidate’s expected influence
8We use K as the nominee so as not to confuse him with a contender.
9We also assume that K’s elected office value is continuous, twice differentiable, and decreasing in the leader’s
reelection effort so that ∂f∂e = f1 < 0 and
∂f
∂2e ≥ 0.
10 ∂o
∂e = o1 > 0.
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over policy.11 We also assume that the leader faces a greater risk of losing an election the more
formidable the candidate. Therefore, we assume that the likelihood of winning the election is pos-
itively related to the leader’s effort: the more effort the leader expends, the safer her reelection.12
Assumptions about information: Finally, we also assume that while the leader cannot per-
fectly observe the candidate’s type, she can observe the candidate’s previous career.13 From ob-
serving the candidate’s previous career path, the leader can derive (imperfect) information about
whether the nominee is a technocrat or a contender.14
Equation (1) shows the candidate’s payoff. K’s utility increases in the expected office valuation
and the expected valuation of policy influence if he accepts the appointment. If he rejects, K
receives a reservation utility, r > 0.
uK(d, e, θ) =
 f(e, θ) + p(e, d) if K acceptsr if K rejects. (1)
Similarly, the leader’s payoff is given in equation (2).
uL(d, e, θ) =
 o(e)− p(e, d)− c(e) if K accepts0 if K rejects (2)
Like K, L’s payoff increases in the expected office valuation o but decreases in the level of auton-
11p(e, d), increases such that ∂p∂e > 0 and
∂p
∂d > 0.
12In our model, stronger candidates discourage the leader from investing additional effort, which increases the odds
of unseating the leader (Banks and Kiewiet 1989). Formally, we define the electoral vote-margin, v, as a function of
the leader’s reelection efforts, v(e), so that ∂v∂e > 0 and
∂v
∂e2 < 0 with v(e) ∈ [0, 1].
13pi ∈ {0, 1}, where pi = 1 indicates that the candidate has held a political office before. Let Φ(pi) be the probability
that a nominee turns out to be a contender conditional on his past political career or Φ(pi) = P (θ = θ¯|pi).
14A contender had incentives to enter into politics prior to becoming a candidate for the central bank governorship.
Similar to the connection between latent productivity and education level of workers in job-market screening models
(Spence 1973), political ambitions may influence a nominee’s previous career path. Contenders incur less costs of
choosing a career path involving politics or have less prospects in career paths outside politics.
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omy awarded. In other words, the leader would like to win the election, award little autonomy, and
expend effort efficiently. We normalize the leader’s reservation utility to zero in the case where the
candidate rejects. Lastly, we assume that reelection efforts go up at an increasing rate.15
Game Sequence
Figure 2 depicts the game sequence. Unsure of the candidate’s political ambition, the leader’s
choice depends on a costless message, sent by the candidate, about his type. First, the leader
chooses a message space, M , from which the candidate, K, chooses to report his type, µ ∈ M .
Having observed K’s message, L makes K an offer to become CBG, with the offer consisting
of a level of policy autonomy d(µ) ∈ [0, 1] and reelection effort e(µ) ∈ [0, 1]. Importantly, we
assume that the leader is committed to this offer; independence and reelection efforts are offered
simultaneously as a “take it or leave it” deal. The candidate then accepts or rejects the leader’s
offer. We solve the game for perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) in pure strategies.
Figure 2: Model Sequence
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A key concern of the leader is that both technocrats and contenders may benefit from misreporting
their type. If the leader makes a one-size-fits-all offer, both types of candidates may have an
15c(e) with c(0) = 0, ∂c∂e = c1 ≥ 0 and ∂c∂e2 = c2 ≥ 0
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incentive to try to extract more concessions from the leader.16 Following the revelation principle
(Myerson 1979), we focus on characterizing a truth-telling mechanism, i.e. an offer menu that
depends on the true type of candidate K. We simplify notation so that d(θ
¯
) = d
¯
, d(θ¯) = d¯,
e(θ
¯
) = e
¯
and e(θ¯) = e¯ and find that the candidate reports truthfully as long as the leader’s offer
satisfies the following constraint for each type:
uK(d¯
), e
¯
), θ
¯
) ≥ uK(d¯, e¯), θ¯) (IC)
uK(d¯, e¯), θ¯) ≥ uK(d¯ , e¯), θ¯) (IC)
These constraints are important for uncovering the equilibrium outcome given the cases of reported
types shown in the next section.
Case 1: Candidate Says He Is a Technocrat
We first establish L′s equilibrium offer if the candidate reports that he is a technocrat. Since L
always prefers that K accepts, her offer must exceed K ′s reservation utility. As the candidates can
be of two types, this implies that the offer must be greater than the reservation utility of both types,
or:
f(e¯, θ¯) + p(e¯, d¯) ≥ r (P )
f(e
¯
, θ
¯
) + p(e
¯
, d
¯
) ≥ r (P )
In conjunction with the truth telling constraint listed above, IC, P implies that,
f(e¯, θ¯) + p(e¯, d¯) ≥ r + f(e
¯
, θ¯)− f(e
¯
, θ
¯
). (3)
16In the appendix we show how the leader always gains by preventing the nominee from misreporting.
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Two implications follow from equation (3). First, if an offer is acceptable to a technocrat, it will
also be acceptable to a contender. Second, a technocrat always receives exactly his reservation
utility in the form of some combination of effort and policy independence.17
Case 2: Candidate says he is a Contender
Next, we consider the leader’s equilibrium offer if the candidate reports that he is a contender.
Intuitively, L, not being able to observe the candidate’s political ambition, is concerned that K
might misreport his type. To prevent misreporting, the leader must implement an offer strategy
that balances the commitment of reelection efforts on the one hand and the delegation of policy
autonomy on the other, while minimizing K ′s information advantage. The leader’s equilibrium
offer reflects these trade-offs.
First, we find that the leader grants more autonomy to a candidate reporting to be a technocrat
than to a candidate reporting to be a contender.18 As effort is increasing in autonomy, nominees
who are technocrats also face more reelection efforts devoted by the leader. Second, any additional
effort exerted towards a technocrat is increasing in the leader’s prior belief that the nominee is a
contender.19
Proposition 1
In equilibrium, the leader’s offer, e∗, d∗ satisfies discriminating offers:
f1(e¯
∗, θ¯) =c1(e¯∗)− o1(e¯∗)
f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
) =c1(e¯
∗)− o1(e¯
∗)
+
Φ
1− Φ(f1(e¯
∗, θ¯)− f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
))
p(d¯∗, e¯∗) =r − f(e¯∗, θ¯)
+ f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)− f(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
)
p(d
¯
∗, e
¯
∗) =r − f(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
)
17How effort and policy independence relate in equilibrium depends on the relative size of his reservation utility,
r, and the value that he places on holding elected office.
18This can be verified by evaluating p(d¯∗, e¯∗) in light of the implication f(e¯∗, θ¯) > f(e
¯
∗, θ¯) from Proposition 1
and our assumption f(e, θ¯) > f(e, θ
¯
).
19This is true as long as f1(e¯
∗, θ¯) > f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
), which holds by our assumption that a contender values elected office
more than a technocrat does.
13
Importantly, while the leader cannot observe the true political ambitions of the candidate, she can
observe his prior career-path. One important question, therefore, centers on how information about
the nominee’s prior experience affects the relationships above.
Proposition 2
If the leader’s expected value of holding office is sufficiently high, she offers less autonomy to a
candidate with political experience.
∂p(e¯∗, d¯∗)
∂Φ
< 0 if o(e
¯
∗) > 2
∂f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)
∂Φ
− f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)− c(e
¯
∗)
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is shown by examining the composition of the equilibrium level
of policy autonomy. Consider the equilibrium autonomy choice from Proposition (1):
p(d¯∗, e¯∗) = r − f(e¯∗, θ¯) + f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)− f(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information Rent
(4)
The key reason why the leader makes discriminating offers based on types is that the contender
can extract more policy autonomy from the leader if he exploits his information advantage. In order
to protect against this, the leader tries to minimize the amount of autonomy granted by extending
discriminating offers. The leader exerts more reelection effort against the technocrat in order to
make it less attractive for a contender to misreport. However, the leader needs to compensate the
technocrat to ensure that he accepts the appointment, and in doing so, offers the technocrat greater
policy autonomy. Intuitively, this means that the technocrat is awarded more policy autonomy as a
function of the leader wanting to deter contenders and that this relationship holds independently of
any personal characteristics that the technocrat may have — such as his policy preferences, ability,
or expertise — and depends only on the technocrat being more interested in policy than holding
elected office. In other words, technocrats are awarded greater policy autonomy so as to dissuade
contenders from participating in the first place.
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Second, prior observable information about the candidate changes how much the leader needs
to discriminate in her offers. The leader adjusts her discriminating offers so as to minimize any
information rent that the candidate may enjoy, or the advantage for the candidate that arises from
knowing something the leader does not. As long as the leader’s own reelection value is suffi-
ciently high, the leader will grant less autonomy to candidates with a previous political career. As
above, this implies a negative relationship between candidates with political experience and policy
independence.
Finally, we ask how the above relationship changes when the leader faces greater threats to her
reelection. Here we find that:
Proposition 3
As long as it is sufficiently likely that a candidate turns out to be a contender, the discriminating
effect increases (decreases) in size as the leader faces an easier (harder) reelection.
∂p(e¯∗, d¯∗)
∂Φ∂e
¯
∗ < 0 if
∂f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
)
∂Φ
<
f1(e¯
∗, θ¯)− f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
)
(1− Φ)2
Proposition 1 implies that as the leader becomes more certain that she faces a contender, she
expends more effort towards reelection against a technocrat than she would under conditions of
perfect information. Intuitively, the leader provides more incentives for the contender to tell the
truth by making it more costly for him to pretend to be a technocrat. This implies there is an addi-
tional “autonomy premium” awarded to the technocrat as a consequence of imperfect information
and irrespective of the candidate’s other qualities. The intuition for Propositions 2 & 3 is similar.
If the information provided by a past political career and subsequently the effort expended towards
reelection effectively reduces the contender’s information rent, the leader grants less autonomy to
a candidate with a past political career. Yet, working in the opposite direction, the leader will limit
paying this “autonomy premium” as her reelection becomes more contested: the more vulnerable
the leader is, the less it makes sense for her to deter contenders by rewarding technocrats.
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Political Experience and Electoral Vulnerability
This section graphically illustrates the main results from above using specific functional forms.20
We show how the level of autonomy offered to the candidates changes as: (1) whether or not the
leader observes past political experience or not and (2) whether the leader’s reelection vulnerability
increases or decreases.
First, given our assumptions, the leader always offers less autonomy to the nominee after hav-
ing observed that he has previous political experience. As shown in Figure 3, what this means in
terms of our model is that d
¯
∗
Φ and d¯
∗
Φ are both negative. For the leader, observing a political career
indicates that she is more likely to face a contender, so it is less important that she learn about
the candidate’s political ambitions by investing in screening. Along with not having to pay these
costs for information, it also lowers the policy independence payoff granted to both the contender
and the technocrat. Furthermore, this result holds generally, so as long as the candidate’s outside
option is more valuable than the technocrat’s elected office value (θ
¯
< r < θ¯).
Second, the penalty for having a political career decreases as the leader faces greater electoral
competition. As noted in Proposition (3), this attenuation effect is conditional on how any ad-
ditional information affects the contender’s information advantage. For example, if the electoral
arena is becoming more competitive because the pool of candidates begins to pose a more serious
electoral threat to the leader, even politically experienced candidates will receive higher offers of
policy autonomy from the leader.21
20For simplicity, we assume linear expected value functions f(e, θ) = (1 − e)θ, p(e, d) = ed and o = eo. We
also assume a quadratic cost function for effort, c(e) = e2. Further, we assume a positive linear relationship between
the leader’s effort e and the electoral vote-margin, v(e) = e. Lastly, let {e¯∗, d¯∗} {e
¯
∗, d¯∗} be the leader’s equilibrium
offers and d¯∗Φ, d¯
∗
Φ the change in autonomy d offered to a technocrat and a contender due to observing that the nominee
has past political experience, Φ.
21This result generalizes to any parameter value of o, θ¯ and Φ. For the case that the candidate reports to be a
technocrat (solid line), the effect is also negative so long as θ
¯
< r < θ¯.
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Figure 3: The Effect of Political Experience on Delegated Autonomy
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Note: The figure shows equilibrium changes for the functional forms of f , p and o as shown in the appendix, assuming
r = 0.6, o = 1.2, θ¯ = 0.8, and Φ = 0.5
Empirical Implications of the Model
Our theory predicts a negative relationship between political experience and policy independence
from the government. Such a relationship is consistent with prior research, but we suggest a new
mechanism for why this may be the case. According to previous theories, technocrats are awarded
greater policy autonomy either because their presumed policy biases for lower inflation help the
government credibly commit to low inflation, or because political parties in competitive elections
want to tie the hands of future governments, preventing them from using monetary policy. Accord-
ing to these theories, independent central banks co-occur with the appointment of technocrats in
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politically competitive environments.
Here, our theory shows that in environments of low electoral competition, politicians with
appointment rights to the central bank can offer technocratic appointments greater policy autonomy
so as to secure the leader’s own political power. In other words, when a leader grants technocrats
greater policy autonomy, the leader establishes entry barriers to the central bank which secures
her hold on power. This entry barrier works to block possible political challengers from entering
political life either through elected or appointed office. In sum, technocratic appointees can be used
by those already in power as a strategy to secure their own political survival. Importantly, however,
we also find that the leader will be less able to pursue the above political market–blocking strategy
when the political arena is more competitive. This brings us to our first empirical prediction:
H1 Imperfect Information: As the nominating politician’s electoral insecurity increases, the
level of policy independence awarded to CBGs with political experience increases as well.
To assess whether our mechanism is truly at work, we also want to evaluate the perfect infor-
mation story. In the perfect information story, technocrats get greater policy independence because
their expertise allows them to conduct better monetary policy (as opposed to politicians, who have
similar qualifications as the leader). Furthermore, the nominating official is more likely to appeal
to outside expertise when political insecurity is higher. This is because she wants to tie the hands of
any opposition party from using monetary policy opportunistically in the future. In order to eval-
uate whether the data supports this explanation instead of our theory, we also test the following
hypothesis:
H2 Perfect Information: As the nominating politician’s electoral insecurity increases, the level
of policy independence awarded to CBGs with policy expertise increases as well.
Data and Methodology
Post-communist countries represent an excellent sample to test the expected relationship among
central bankers’ backgrounds, electoral competition, and central bank autonomy. First, despite
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varying levels of wealth and economic conditions, all countries faced a need to undertake eco-
nomic and political reforms — including reforming their central banks — at around the same time
(Frye 2010). Second, the reform trajectories vary significantly over time and across countries (see
also Johnson 2016). Some countries, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Hungary, and Romania re-
formed their banks in three stages, increasing their independence at each step, however. countries
such as Belarus and Macedonia also rolled back their central banks’ level of independence. Also
important is that political competition varies. In Eastern Europe, the line between authoritarian
and democratic rule is often tenuous, as recent incidents in Hungary and Poland show. Finally,
some CBGs have political experience while others do not. Even in authoritarian regimes, there are
several examples of CBGs with political experience. The first president of post-Kuchma Ukraine
was a former CBG, Viktor Yushchenko. The Republic of Georgia’s current CB governor, Koba
Gvenetadze, was a deputy state minister and deputy minister of finance before assuming his post
at the CB. Tolkunbek Abdygulov of Kyrgyzstan served a stint as deputy prime minister after being
a central bank governor. Outside of Central Asia, György Matolcsy, the current central bank gov-
ernor in backsliding Hungary, was a member of parliament as well as a minister of the economy
on two separate occasions.
We contribute a new dataset on monetary policy independence and biographical information
of CBG career experience across time in 29 post-communist countries, between 1990 and 2012.22
This new dataset incorporates measures of central bank autonomy based on monetary policy inde-
pendence and constraints on government borrowing (Garriga 2016). It also includes newly com-
piled biographical information on all CBG appointments for those countries that were either Soviet
republics, members of the Warsaw Pact, or held very close ties to the Soviet Union, such as Mon-
golia. To stay consistent with previous literature, we follow the coding efforts of Hallerberg and
Wehner (2017), who also code biographical information for political actors (CBGs, Prime Minis-
22We consider Czechoslovakia as a separate country. Plots of the CBI variable for each country are given in the
Appendix.
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ters, Presidents, and Finance Ministers), although these authors consider the biographies of actors
in OECD countries only. We code whether the individual has ever held a political post in any
post-communist government or legislature. In our dataset, being politically experienced in the
early 1990s means that an individual held a position in the transition government/legislature, not
in the communist regime.23 Finally, we gathered important information about which nominating
politician is eligible to make central bank appointments.
Policy Autonomy
Our main dependent variable is policy autonomy. The aggregate CBI index commonly used in the
literature is an average of four dimensions of de jure CBI including personnel, policy objectives,
policy tools, and limitations on lending to the government. In the composite measure, these dimen-
sions are weighted according to the judgment of the initial authors (Cukierman 1992). Rather than
use the composite index, we consider those components most related to policy autonomy. First,
we use the component “policy independence” in country j in year t, from the Cukierman (1992)
measure, recently updated by Garriga (2016). This is the most direct test of our argument, as it
measures how much policy independence the government awards the central bank. As a second
measure of policy autonomy, we also examine whether the central bank has legal limitations on
lending to the national government, “limitations on lending” from the same index. The greater the
policy independence, the larger the legal limitations for lending to the government, and the more
autonomy the central bank has from the government.24,25
23As a result, this makes our key independent variable somewhat different from Hallerberg and Wehner (2017);
however, we use the same coding rules as these authors for operationalizing vocational experience, with further details
outlined in the appendix.
24To show the robustness of our results, we also use the composite CBI index rather than just the two components
listed above. The full index ranges from 0 (completely dependent) to 1 (completely independent), with a sample mean
of 0.64 and a standard error of 0.20. The main results show policy independence and limitations on lending as the DV;
results when using the full index (shown in the appendix) do not vary significantly.
25Unfortunately, we only have measures of official CBI. Despite this, by using the components as well as the index,
we can be more confident that our results are not fit to any particular measure of CBI. We show the variable series
graphically in the appendix.
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Career Experience
Our key explanatory variable is whether the appointed CBG has political experience or not. We
define political experience as having had a career as a party official, running in an election, holding
political office via direct or indirect election, or holding an appointed office in one of the branches
of the government after 1990 or the first year of independence; this variable is coded 1 if yes to
the above and 0 if no.26 Out of a total of 163 central bankers in our dataset, 43 (26%) pursue a
political career after being appointed to the central bank, and 66 (40%) have political experience
before becoming the CBG. In our sample, CBGs have had political roles including but not limited
to president (one CBG), prime minister (four), deputy prime minister (nine), and finance minister
or deputy finance minister (13). Presidents and prime ministers represent 7% of our sample of po-
litical experience; deputy prime ministers, 14%; and finance minister or deputy finance ministers,
20%.
We also code whether the appointed CBG’s two significant vocational experiences involved
working in an international organization. As above, IO experience holds the value of 1 if the in-
dividual has experience in an IO and 0 if not. Importantly, these two attributes are not mutually
exclusive. Approximately half of the individuals that held previous careers in politics also have
vocational experience working in an IO (52%). Those that do match on these attributes, how-
ever, held office for a relatively short period of time. Only in 5% of country-years with political
appointments does the CBG also have experience working in an IO.
To measure policy ability or expertise, we also code whether or not an individual holds a Ph.D.
in Economics. This variable also represents a large share of those people in our sample (57 out of
162, or 35%).
26Information about the CBG’s past employment experience is not part of the CBI index, and therefore we are
confident that these measures are independent from our main explanatory variables. Having previously worked at the
central bank is not considered political experience.
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Electoral Competition facing the Appointer
We focus on electoral contests where the politician has the appointment rights to the central bank.
To determine this, we collected information from central bank laws, directories, websites, and
secondary sources to determine who gets to draft the initial nominee list for the central bank.
Interestingly, we find significant variation in who gets to draft the initial list of nominees across
central banks in our sample. In 153 country-year cases, parliament makes the initial appointment;
in 393 country-year cases, the president makes initial appointment; and in 43 country-year cases,
the prime minister. We drop 23 country-year cases in which the initial appointing office is done by
a domestic political actor. These country-year cases include Georgia, where the suggestion for the
CBG comes directly from the central bank board. We also drop all cases where the central bank
law is not reformed and the country retains Soviet-era central bank governors.
We measure electoral competition facing the nominating official two ways. First, we proxy
electoral competition using the margin of victory that the political candidate wins in the election.
For legislative elections, we measure competition with seat margins, or the difference in the number
of seats won by the first and second most successful parties.27 We then transform the variable,
taking 1− seatmargin such that electoral competition is higher when the seat margin is smaller,
and electoral competition is lower when the seat margin is larger. When the president rather than
the legislature determines the CBG appointment, we use the difference in the number of votes
between the first and second candidate in the first round of the presidential elections. As above,
we transform this variable 1 − votemargin, such that a smaller vote margin is associated with
higher competition and a larger vote margin with lower competition.28 The underlying data are
from Coppedge et al. (2017), which aggregates election data from Europe and Asia (Nohlen and
Stöver 2010; Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann 2001).
27We use the seat margins for the parliamentary elections rather than vote margins because of greater data avail-
ability. Our results hold across the type of margin.
28There are a few cases with the vote margin is larger than one in our dataset. This is due to cases where candidate B
in the first round received fewer votes than candidate A, but in subsequent rounds, received more votes than candidate
A.
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As a second indicator of political competition that might be more illuminating in the more
autocratic countries in our dataset, we also measure the level of popular mobilization against the
government before the election. This comes from the British Broadcasting Corporation’s Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts coded in the Cline Center Historical Phoenix Event Dataset (Althaus
et al. 2017; Beaulieu 2014). More specifically, we count the reported number of active protests,
postures of force, coercion, breakdown of negotiations, assaults, and physical fights targeting gov-
ernment institutions or officials in a given year. For those years where the nominating official faced
an election, we included only those protest events that happened before the election.
Other Variables
We also include a number of other variables to account for possible confounding factors. To
measure the level of financial development or trust in the central bank, we include a measure of
contract-intensive money (CIM). CIM reflects the proportion of money that is held in the official
banking sector, derived from a measure of the money supply (M2) (Clague et al. 1999). One
interpretation is that CIM proxies the security of property rights (in this case, financial assets).
Previous literature finds that political institutions are essential to the proper functioning of CBI
in democracies. As such, we also include a measure of checks and balances from the Database of
Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). As in Keefer and Stasavage (2003), we expect the level of
checks to be positively associated with higher levels of policy autonomy.29
The degree of urbanization may affect the level of prices and also the demand for independent
economic institutions. Therefore, we include the share of the population living in urban areas,
urban population, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Like the above
measures, we also expect this variable to be positively associated with higher levels of autonomy.
We include a measure of the country’s growth rate from the WDI, which we expect matters for
29As a robustness check, we also replace this measure with a measure of democracy using Polity2 (Marshall,
Jaggers, and Gurr 2013) and a measure of media freedom (Whitten-Woodring and Belle 2017). We find no significant
differences in the findings. These and other robustness checks are included in the appendix.
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both the level of policy autonomy as well as for the competitiveness of the election, gdp per capita
growth.30
Finally, there is an obvious upward trend in the composite CBI index over time. We include
a time count variable. This variable starts at the beginning of our sample (1990) and goes up
incrementally by 1 unit until the end of our sample (2012) (Marsh and Mikhaylov 2012) so as to
account for this trend.31
Model Specification
We estimate three models, each increasing in structure: a pooled model (1), a country fixed-effects
model (2) and a country fixed-effects model with an assumed AR(1) process (3).32 Model (2), for
example, is specified as:33
yj,t =α + β1PEj,t + β2ECj,t + β3(PEj,t ∗ ECj,t) + β ′xXj,t + θj + j,t
Empirical Results
We present the results from our model specifications (1-3) using a coefficients’ plot for ease of in-
terpretation. As expected, we find a negative independent relationship between political experience
and policy autonomy, measured either by policy independence or limits on government lending.
30We also include EU membership and candidacy, along with Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2017)’s coarse mea-
sure of a country’s exchange rate regime in robustness checks. We find no major differences across the models even
when we include these additional variables.
31As another specification, we also subtracted the global mean level of CBI from the dependent variable and re-ran
the analyses; the simple time trend seems to work more effectively at removing the trend, and so we report these and
other robustness exercises in the appendix.
32Model 3 addresses potential serial correlation of type AR(1) using a two-step Prais-Winsten feasible generalized
least squares (FGLS) procedure with panel-specific autocorrelation coefficients. We estimate the model yj,t = α +
β1PEj,t + β2ECj,t + β3(PEj,t ∗ ECj,t) + β′x(Xj,t) + θj + νj,t, with νi,t = ρiνi,t−1 + ui,t assuming that ui,t is
white noise.
33The shares of missing values in our data range between 0 and 19%, which leads to the listwise deletion of 386
country-years. For our main analyses, we report the findings with missing data. In the appendix we report models
using imputed data across 10 datasets, using the AMELIA II package (Honaker, King, Blackwell, et al. 2011). The
results are consistent with the results of the main analysis.
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Figure 4: Effects of Political Experience and Electoral Competition on Lending Limitations and
Policy Independence
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Note: The plot represent the model results depicted in the supplemental appendix. Columns (1) and (2) report co-
efficients from the models using the CBI index component “Limitations on Lending" as dependent variable, using
“Electoral Competition" and “Protests" as independent variables. Columns (2) and (3) report the corresponding coeffi-
cients for the models using “Policy Independence" as dependent variable. We report heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors except for the AR(1) model.
This implies that CBGs with political backgrounds get lower levels of autonomy than those CBGs
without political experience. Our other main variable, electoral competition, measured either by
vote and/or seat margin or number of protests, demonstrates little independent effect, either statis-
tically or substantively.
Rather than only consider the independent effects, our hypotheses consider the interaction be-
tween political experience and the strength of political competition facing the nominating politi-
cian. As reported in Figure 5, which shows the marginal effects, we find that CBGs with political
experience are associated with higher levels of policy independence as political competition for
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Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Political Experience on Lending Limitations and Policy Indepen-
dence
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Note: The plot reports the marginal effects from the country fixed-effects models. Rows represent the CBI compo-
nents “Policy Independence" and “Limitations on Lending" as dependent variables, and columns represent “Electoral
Competition" and “Protests" as independent variables. The shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals using het-
eroscedasticity robust standard errors.
the appointer’s post increases. When we operationalize policy autonomy as limitations on lending
to the government, this positive effect is less pronounced. Interestingly, however, we find the con-
verse pattern when we measure electoral competition using protests against the government. Here
we find that CBGs with political experience are only weakly positively associated with policy in-
dependence, but the positive relationship is much stronger for limitations on government lending
then for policy independence.
In terms of our other variables, Figure 5, shows that GDP growth is positively associated with
policy autonomy across all models, although its effects are not large. The CIM measure is posi-
tively associated with autonomy until we account for the observed increasing trend in central bank
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independence over time. The time trend likely picks up over-time covariation in movements, such
as an increase in the credibility of central banks over time. Our urban population variable is also
not substantively important; neither is the democracy variable DPI checks.34. Similarly, another
possible explanation is that career experience in international organizations (IOs) rather than elec-
toral threats matters for policy independence (Johnson 2016). While we find a positive relationship
between IO experience and policy independence in the pooled model, the effects are less clear once
we account for country and time trends. Furthermore, our interaction is robust even when we in-
clude whether someone has worked in an IO, suggesting that political rather than IO vocational
experience matters for policy independence.35
While the above results suggests some support for our theory, we also test the perfect informa-
tion case as it could be that the above positive relationship also holds for experts as well. To do this,
we replace CBG political experience with those CBGs with Economics PhDs. We then investigate
whether we observe a similar upward slope as electoral competition rises. Recall that in contrast
to the predictions made by our theory, according to the perfect information case, technocrats will
receive higher levels of policy independence because they are experts and have an advantage at
conducting monetary policy (as opposed to politicians, who have the same qualifications as the
leader) and that we expect this premium to increase as electoral competition increases.
We present the results from our same model specifications (1-3) as before. Interestingly, we
find little evidence of an independent relationship between having an economics PhD and the level
of policy autonomy. Similarly, our measures of electoral competition are not related to policy
autonomy in any independent way, as above.
Our variable of interest is the interaction between expertise (proxied by having a PhD in eco-
nomics) and the strength of political competition facing the nominating official. As shown in
34Nor is it significant for Polity 2 or media freedoms, tables in the appendix
35We also check other measures of democracy including policy and media freedom and find no significantly differ-
ent results. We also change our measure of electoral competition for a measure of time until the next election and find
no relationship with policy autonomy. This makes us more confident that our findings are that political competition
facing the nominating official matters rather than elections.
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Figure 6: Effects of an Economics PhD and Electoral Competition on Lending Limitations and
Policy Independence
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Note: The plot represent the model results depicted in the supplemental appendix. Columns (1) and (2) report co-
efficients from the models using the CBI index component “Limitations on Lending" as dependent variable, using
“Electoral Competition" and “Protests" as independent variables. Columns (2) and (3) report the corresponding coeffi-
cients for the models using “Policy Independence" as dependent variable. We report heteroscedasticity robust standard
errors except for the AR(1) model.
Figure 7, we find that CBGs with more expertise do not get higher levels of policy autonomy
as political competition for the appointer’s post increases. Interestingly, and unlike the political
experience results reported above, we find null results irrespective of whether we measure elec-
toral competition by vote/seat margin or by the number of protests, or whether we consider policy
independence or limitations on government lending.
In summary, we find that candidates with political experience are associated with higher levels
of policy autonomy as electoral competition facing the appointing politician rises. Furthermore,
we find no evidence of such a relationship for those CBG with expertise, as measured by having a
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Figure 7: Marginal Effect of the CB Governor holding an Economics PhD on CBI
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Note: The plot reports the results from the country fixed-effects models with the CBI components “Policy Indepen-
dence" and “Limitations on Lending" as dependent variables and an indicator if the CBG Governor holds a PhD in
Economics as conditional independent variable. The shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals using heteroscedas-
tic robust standard errors.
PhD in economics. This, coupled with the fact that we examine elections only for those nominating
officials that directly hold appointment powers for the CBG, points to the role of information
screening in delegating policy independence to the central bank.
Alternative Explanations
We now consider possible alternative explanations. Rather than be associated with screening, ap-
pointments to the central bank may serve other functions. First, they may be a reward for party
service, for example, as pre-retirement placements. If this were true, political experience would
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not indicate the future political ambitions of a candidate, but would still be positively correlated
with appointments, which might confound our interpretation. Second, the political leader might
use the CBG post to co-opt strong electoral challengers. Political leaders may offer a position
with considerable power (i.e., higher policy autonomy) under conditions of strong electoral com-
petition. As above, such an argument might also confound our interpretation. Common to these
explanations, however, is an expectation about the sequence of political experience and holding the
central bank governorship. According to these arguments, the candidate gains political experience
before he becomes CBGs. It then follows that we would observe the same positive interaction as
above, but for only those CBGs with previous, not subsequent, political experience.
To test this, we distinguish between candidates with political experience before and after they
became CBG. We then re-run the analyses on a sub-sample of CBG with political experience after
they hold the CBG post. As shown in Figure 8, we find a similar positive relationship between
political competition and levels of autonomy awarded to the CBG even in this subsample. This
lends further support to our argument that politicians with appointment powers to the central bank
have incentives to appoint technocratic candidates to deter politically motivated candidates, how-
ever, their ability to do so is conditioned by the level of political competition the face: as political
competition increases, it becomes less beneficial for the nominating official to invest in deterring
politically minded candidates and is therefore more likely to award even politically ambitious can-
didates similar levels of autonomy to that awarded to technocrats.
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Figure 8: Marginal Effect of Future Political Experience on CBI
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Note: The plot reports the results from the country fixed-effects models with the CBI components “Policy Indepen-
dence" and “Limitations on Lending" as dependent variables and an indicator if the CB governors held a political post
after their appointment. The shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals using heteroscedastic robust standard errors.
Conclusion
What conditions determine the level of policy independence delegated to a country’s central bank?
Our theory demonstrates that politicians who are responsible for nominating central banks gov-
ernors (CBGs) may use technocratic appointments to dissuade politically motivated central bank
candidates. We show that the success in doing so, however, crucially depends on the expected
closeness of the race faced by the appointer. As either the overall quality of challengers increases
or as elections become more competitive, the appointer’s willingness to use discriminating offers
to deter politically minded central bankers lessens. Our model therefore finds evidence of a pre-
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viously unexplored relationship between central bank appointments and policy independence, one
that is conditioned by the level of electoral competition facing the nominating politician. We find
that the level of independence granted to candidates with political backgrounds increases as elec-
toral victories narrow. Another contribution is the development of a new and important dataset that
looks at the career experience of CBGs outside of the OECD.
While our argument focuses on those conditions that determine autonomy given to CBGs as
a consequence of election concerns facing the appointer, outstanding questions remain. Future
research might explore the economic consequences of the increasing number of CBGs with polit-
ical experience, asking whether political CBGs influence inflation, asset prices, or growth rates.
Similarly, while some suggest that unelected bureaucrats need be more accountable to voters, it
is worth investigating whether or not those countries with more politically experienced officials
are indeed more accountable to citizens. One alternative and more pessimistic argument, which
our evidence suggests, is that with an increase in political competition, the marginal efficiency of
investing resources to keep politically minded candidates out of independent arms of the govern-
ment declines for those politicians appointing them. Our argument, therefore, points to challenges
in bureaucratic development. On the one hand, new countries must select and promote a new
generation of political leaders in order to effectively manage the country. On the other hand, the
coupling of independent agencies staffed with actors with strong political motivations may bring
to the forefront inter-elite conflict.
The role of partisanship is also worth further investigation: in intra-elite bargaining such as
what we see here, a shared partisan identity may promote trust between the CBG and the ap-
pointer, who might then be more generous with the level of autonomy. In our sample of CBGs,
many governors — particularly those without political careers — simply do not reveal their par-
tisan identity, and others self-identify as independents. Furthermore, in Eastern Europe, Ibenskas
and Sikk (2017) argue that while there has been some development to the party system, the strength
of membership organizations remains weak, which makes assigning parties — especially to candi-
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dates who may have an interest in hiding their partisan affiliation — particularly difficult. Future
research considering the ways in which partisanship, or lack thereof, contributes to these bargain-
ing dynamics would make a fruitful contribution to the literature.
For now, our paper contributes a deeper understanding of the interaction between strategies
aimed at electoral survival and those aimed at delegation. While previous research has centered on
the need for nominating officials to signal to investors, the domestic public, and opposition parties
that they are credibly committing to a low-inflation policy, our findings point out that elites also
make calculations about their political survival. More broadly, our theory shows that principals can
attempt to modify the levels of an agency’s policy independence, depending on the learned career
ambitions of the agency director, rather than the other way around. Additionally it also shows that
the principal’s ability to do so is constrained by her hold on power (or not). Our paper, therefore,
paints a more nuanced picture of the calculations that politicians make when handing over power.
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Supplemental Appendix
Proofs
The leader’s problem can be written as
max
{d¯,e¯},{d
¯
,e
¯
}
Φ(o(e¯)− p(e¯, d¯)− c(c¯)) + (1− Φ)(o(e
¯
)− p(e
¯
, d
¯
)− c(c
¯
))
subject to
f(e¯, θ¯) + p(e¯, d¯) ≥ r (P )
f(e
¯
, θ
¯
) + p(e
¯
, d
¯
) ≥ r (P )
f(e
¯
, θ
¯
) + p(e
¯
, d
¯
) ≥ f(e¯, θ
¯
) + p(e¯, d¯) (IC)
f(e¯, θ¯) + p(e¯, d¯) ≥ f(e
¯
, θ¯) + p(e
¯
, d
¯
) (IC)
Further we remind the reader, that we assume that f(e, θ¯) > f(e, θ
¯
), ∂f
∂e
= f1 < 0 and ∂f∂2e ≥ 0 as
well as ∂p
∂e
> 0, ∂p
∂d
> 0, o(e) > c(e) + f(e, θ¯) ,∂o(e)
∂e
= o1 > 0 and
∂c(e)
∂e
= c1 > 0. As shown in
the discussion of Equation (3) in the text P holds by implication of IC and P . Further, because
f(e, θ¯) > f(e, θ
¯
), P and IC are always binding. Therefore, the following problem is an equivalent
problem above as long as its solution satisfies IC. First, present the solution to the problem and
the verify that it satisfies IC.
max
e¯≥0,e
¯
≥0
Φ(o(e¯)− p(e¯, d¯)− c(c¯)) + (1− Φ)(o(e
¯
)− p(e
¯
, d
¯
)− c(c
¯
))
subject to
f(e
¯
, θ
¯
) + p(e
¯
, d
¯
) = r (P )
f(e¯, θ¯) + p(e¯, d¯) = f(e¯, θ
¯
) + p(e¯, d¯) (IC)
Proposition 1
In equilibrium, the leader’s offer, e∗, d∗, must satisfy
f1(e¯
∗, θ¯) =c1(e¯∗)− o1(e¯∗)
f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
) =c1(e¯
∗)− o1(e¯
∗)
+
Φ
1− Φ(f1(e¯
∗, θ¯)− f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
))
p(d¯∗, e¯∗) =r − f(e¯∗, θ¯)
+ f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)− f(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
)
p(d
¯
∗, e
¯
∗) =r − f(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
)
By substituting the constraints in the objective function and rewriting the problem we get
max
e¯≥0,e
¯
≥0
o(e
¯
)− c(e
¯
)− r − f(e
¯
, θ
¯
) +
Φ
1− Φ(o(e¯)− c(e¯)− r − f(e¯, θ¯))−
Φ
1− Φ(f(e¯, θ¯)− f(e¯, θ¯))
1
Assuming that S(e, θ
¯
, θ¯) = o(e
¯
)− c(e
¯
)− r− Φ
1−Φ(f(e¯
, θ¯)− f(e
¯
, θ
¯
)) is strictly concave with regard
to e, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are a sufficient condition for a global maximum. The Lagrangian
is L(e
¯
, e¯, λ1, λ2) = o(e¯
) − c(e
¯
) − r − f(e
¯
, θ
¯
) + Φ
1−Φ(o(e¯) − c(e¯) − r − f(e¯, θ¯)) − Φ1−Φ(f(e¯, θ¯) −f(e
¯
, θ
¯
)) + λ1e¯
+ λ2e¯. A critical point must thus satisfy
o1(e¯
) + f1(e¯
, θ
¯
)− c1(e¯)−
Φ
1− Φ(f1(e¯, θ¯)− f1(e¯, θ¯)) + λ1 = 0
Φ
1− Φ(o1(e¯) + f1(e¯, θ¯)− c1(e¯)) + λ2 = 0
e
¯
, e¯, λ1, λ2 ≥ 0, λ1e¯ = λ2e¯ = 0
If e¯ = 0 then o1(0) + f1(0, θ¯)− c1(0) ≤ 0 which would contradict ∂S∂e > 0 for e = 0. Thus, e¯ > 0
which implies λ2 = 0 and o1(e¯) + f1(e¯, θ¯)− c1(e¯)) = 0. Similarly, if e¯ = 0 then o1(0) + f1(0, θ¯)−c1(0)− Φ1−Φ(f1(0, θ¯)− f1(0, θ¯)) ≤ 0 which would contradict
∂S
∂e
> 0 for e = 0. Thus, e
¯
> 0 which
implies λ1 = 0 and o1(e¯
) + f1(e¯
, θ
¯
)− c1(e¯)−
Φ
1−Φ(f1(e¯
, θ¯)− f1(e¯, θ¯)) = 0.Solving these two conditions for the unique global maximum (e¯∗, e
¯
∗) and (d¯∗, d
¯
∗) yields
f1(e¯
∗, θ¯) =c1(e¯∗)− o1(e¯∗)
f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
) =c1(e¯
∗)− o1(e¯
∗) +
Φ
1− Φ(f1(e¯
∗, θ¯)− f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
))
p(d¯∗, e¯∗) =r − f(e¯∗, θ¯) + f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)− f(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
)
p(d
¯
∗, e
¯
∗) =r − f(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
)
Lastly, we must show that the above solution satisfies IC. Together, IC and IC implies that the
solution must satisfy
f(e¯, θ¯)− f(e
¯
, θ¯) ≥ p(e
¯
, d
¯
)− p(e¯, d¯) ≥ f(e¯, θ
¯
)− f(e
¯
, θ
¯
)
which implies that if e
¯
∗ ≥ e¯∗ the solution satisfies IC.
Assume e¯∗ > e
¯
∗, then
f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
) = c1(e¯
∗)− o1(e¯
∗) +
Φ
1− Φ(f1(e¯
∗, θ¯)− f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
))
> c1(e¯
∗)− o1(e¯
∗) ≥ c1(e¯∗)− o1(e¯∗) = f1(e¯∗, θ¯)
which implies e¯∗ ≥ e
¯
∗ which contradicts our initial assumption. Thus e¯∗ ≥ e
¯
∗ must be true and
our solution satisfies IC.
2
Proposition 2
If the leader’s office value is sufficiently high, she offers less discretion to a candidate with political
experience.
∂p(e¯∗, d¯∗)
∂Φ
< 0 if o(e
¯
∗) > 2
∂f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)
∂Φ
− f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)− c(e
¯
∗)
From Proposition 1 we have ∂p(e¯
∗,d¯∗)
∂Φ
= ∂f(e¯
∗,θ¯)
∂Φ
− ∂f(e¯∗,θ¯)
∂Φ
. Thus, ∂p(e¯
∗,d¯∗)
∂Φ
< 0 under the condition
∂f(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
)
∂Φ
>
∂f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)
∂Φ
(1)
which after substitution simplifies to
Φ >
∂f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)
∂Φ
− f(e¯
∗, θ¯) + o(e
¯
∗)− c(e
¯
∗)
∂f(e
¯
∗,θ¯)
∂Φ
.
Since Φ > 0, a sufficient condition for (1) to hold is o(e
¯
∗) > 2∂f(e¯
∗,θ¯)
∂Φ
− f(e
¯
∗, θ¯)− c(e
¯
∗).
Proposition 3
As long as it is sufficiently likely that a candidate turns out to be a contender, the discriminating
effect decreases in size as the leader exerts more effort towards campaigning.
∂p(e¯∗, d¯∗)
∂Φ∂e
¯
∗ < 0 if
∂f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
)
∂Φ
<
f1(e¯
∗, θ¯)− f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
)
(1− Φ)2
Taking the second derivative of p(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
) with regard to Φ and e
¯
∗ we have
∂p(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
)
∂Φ∂e
¯
∗ =
∂f1(e¯
∗, θ¯)
∂Φ
− ∂f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
)
∂Φ
which after substitution simplifies to
∂p(e
¯
∗, θ
¯
)
∂Φ∂e
¯
∗ =
o1(e¯
∗)− c1(e¯
∗) + f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
)− (1− Φ)Φ∂f1(e¯∗,θ¯)
∂Φ
Φ2
so ∂p(e¯
∗,θ
¯
)
∂Φ∂e
¯
∗ < 0 under the condition
∂f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
)
∂Φ
<
f1(e¯
∗, θ¯)− f1(e¯
∗, θ
¯
)
(1− Φ)2
3
Data and Sample Construction
We first collected the names of all the CBG’s appointed during this period, using information
from two periodicals: the Central Bank Directory (Pringle, 1994) and the Annual Reports of The
World’s Central Banks (Joint Bank-Fund Library, 1984). Unfortunately, we do not have a list of
all possible individuals considered for the appointment, only those that are actually appointed. For
those cases where there was discrepanciess across sources, we went with the information on the
CB’s official website and cross-checked our names with other scholars working on this topic.
Our sample includes one President, four Prime Ministers, nine Deputy Prime Ministers, and
13 Finance Minister or Deputy Finance Minister. Presidents and Prime Ministers are therefore 7%
of the sample with political experience, Deputy Prime Ministers 14%, and Finance Minister or
Deputy Finance Ministers 20%. If we add those all together, this means that in our sample 41% of
those politician/CB occupy very important positions in the government.
Coding for Personal Biographies
Our dataset compiles biographical information on political activity, educational background and
professional experience of political leaders from post-communist countries between 1991 - 2012.
These leaders include presidents, prime ministers, finance ministers and central bank governors
and covers 30 countries that were either Soviet republics, members of the Warsaw Pact or held
very close ties to the Soviet Union such as the Balkan states and Mongolia.
We use individual specific sources of biographical information to code the variables accord-
ing to the definitions listed in Table 1. The data-set contains a detailed list of sources for each
individual. We distinguish between primary information, meaning that the individual herself sanc-
tioned the reported information, and secondary information, meaning that third parties reported the
information potentially without permission.
For most of the information we want to acquire such as education and professional background,
primary sources are preferable to secondary sources because the individual’s incentives to provide
accurate biographical information. Secondary sources are more prone to report information from
hear-say and other unverified sources. However, for information on political activities, such as
being a regime dissident or holding a political office before 1991 there may exist substantial incen-
tives for the individual to misrepresent the information publicly. Thus, we always check primary
sources for consistency with secondary sources to identify cases with inconsistent publicly avail-
able information.
1. Look for primary source
• code all variables for which primary information is available
• report inconsistencies in “notes”, report sources used in “sources”, separated by a semi-
colon
2. Look for secondary sources
• check variables from primary information for inconsistencies
4
• report inconsistencies in “notes” and mark “...name” in red
• code all remaining variables for which secondary information is available
3. Mark unavailable data points with “.”
Primary Sources Self-reported Official CV or Resume from personal website
Autobiography
Other-reported CV from organization websites
Sanctioned Biographies
Secondary Sources Other-reported Reviewed Encyclopedias
Biographies
Press or news releases
Open encyclopedias
For most of the information we want to acquire such as education and professional background,
primary sources are preferable to secondary sources because the individual’s incentives to provide
accurate biographical information. Secondary sources are more prone to report information from
hear-say and other unverified sources. However, for information on political activities, such as
being a regime dissident or holding a political office before 1991 there may exist substantial incen-
tives for the individual to misrepresent the information publicly. Thus, we always check primary
sources for consistency with secondary sources to identify cases with inconsistent publicly avail-
able information.
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Figure 1 illustrates the variety of professional experience of post-communist leaders across our
sample: CBGs, Finance Ministers, Prime Ministers, and Presidents, both before and after their
appointments to the country’s central bank. In the case of CBGs, we see that while many CBGs
come directly from Ph.D. programs, still others come from the political system. After leaving the
central bank, in their post-governor appointments, a large number of CBGs also move into political
careers as well. We also see that many individuals that held positions as Finance Ministers and
Prime Ministers also held posts working in central banks. In our sample of CBG with political
experience.
Figure A1: Careers of Leaders Before and After Appointment
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Additional Empirical Tests
We also examine whether type of political experience matters. Here we find some evidence that
appointments of individuals from legislatures particularly drive this result. The estimates shown
in Figures 3 and 4 are based on the same specification except that we replace the dummy for
political experience with multiple discrete variables indicating in which branch of government the
individual has experience. Our results indicate that the relationship is strongest for those with
legislative experience and this is again especially true for policy independence, which is the same
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as results presented in the main paper.
Table 8: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
CBI 576 0.642 0.204 0.148 0.482 0.846 0.979
Political Experience 563 0.524 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Victory Margin 528 0.318 0.301 −0.120 0.058 0.568 0.977
Pre-Electoral Protest 563 1.355 3.256 0.000 0.000 1.000 29.000
Growth 567 2.861 7.826 −45.325 0.601 7.211 35.390
Contract Intensive Money 495 0.747 0.153 0.242 0.667 0.869 0.962
Checks & Balances 612 57.094 11.683 26.501 50.975 67.360 75.697
IO Experience 538 3.052 1.637 1.000 2.000 4.000 8.000
IO pre-CBG 570 0.100 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Number of country-years in sample: 613
17
Table 9: Effects of Political Experience on Limitations on Lending and Policy Independence by
Source of Experience
Dependent variable:
Lim.Len Pol.Ind Lim.Len Pol.Ind
Non-Imputed Non-Imputed Non-Imputed Non-Imputed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Legislative Exp. (LEG) −0.128 −0.434 −0.218 −0.057
(-0.716,0.459) (-0.760,-0.108) (-0.326,-0.110) (-0.127,0.014)
Executive Exp. (EXEC) −0.015 −0.125 −0.061 −0.048
(-0.137,0.108) (-0.267,0.017) (-0.134,0.012) (-0.106,0.010)
EXP & LEG −0.461 −0.613 −0.076 −0.204
(-0.831,-0.091) (-0.920,-0.306) (-0.250,0.097) (-0.339,-0.070)
Electoral
Competition (EC)
(1-Victory Margin) 0.054 −0.061
(-0.082,0.189) (-0.164,0.042)
Number of
Protests (NP) −0.004 0.003
(-0.011,0.002) (-0.001,0.007)
LEG*EC −0.087 0.454
(-0.797,0.622) (0.069,0.840)
LEG*NP 0.004 −0.027
(-0.043,0.051) (-0.057,0.004)
EXEC*EC −0.069 0.091
(-0.267,0.130) (-0.086,0.267)
EXEC*NP 0.004 −0.002
(-0.004,0.012) (-0.008,0.004)
LEG & EXEC*EC 0.482 0.549
(0.087,0.878) (0.226,0.872)
LEG & EXEC*NP 0.041 0.066
(-0.009,0.092) (0.020,0.113)
Constant 1.949 1.804 2.291 1.608
(1.112,2.785) (1.176,2.432) (1.421,3.160) (0.848,2.367)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.684 0.703 0.671 0.671
SE Type Newey-West Newey-West Newey-West Newey-West
Error Correction No No No No
Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 370 370 375 375
Note: The variable LEG, EXEC and LEG & EXEC indicate if an individual had legislative, executive or both types of
political experience prior to appointment. Intervals in parentheses denote 95% confidence intervals using the type of
standard error denoted in the row "SE Type".
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Figure A2: CBI by Country
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Figure A3: Marginal Effects of Different Sources of Political Experience on CBI
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Note: The plot reports the marginal effects from the country fixed-effects model with CBI as dependent variable.
Columns represent "Electoral Competition" and "Protests" as independent variables. The shaded areas show 95%
confidence intervals using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
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Figure A4: Marginal Effects of Political Experience on CBI
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Note: The plot reports the marginal effects from the country fixed-effects model with CBI as dependent variable.
Columns represent "Electoral Competition" and "Protests" as independent variables. The shaded areas show 95%
confidence intervals using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
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Figure A5: Marginal Effects of Political Experience on Lending Limitations and Policy Indepen-
dence, Controlling for EU Membership and Exchange Rate Regime
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Note: The plot reports the marginal effects from the country fixed-effects models from table 6 and 10, columns 5 and
8. Rows represent the CBI components "Policy Independence" and "Limitations on Lending" as dependent variables
and columns represent "Electoral Competition" and "Protests" as independent moderator variables. The shaded areas
show 95% confidence intervals using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
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Figure A6: CBG Tenure, Experience and Election Years by Country
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